CORPORATIONS: CONFIDENTIAL, TENTATIVE STUDIES
HELD NOT TO BE CORPORATE "BOOKS" UNDER
SHAREHOLDER INSPECTION STATUTE

IN State ex rel. Jones v. Ralston PurinaCo.,' the Supreme Court of
Missouri recently held that tentative corporate studies in the nature
of confidential inter-office communications prepared solely for the
information of management were not within a shareholder's statutory right of inspection as corporate "books."
Relying upon the Missouri shareholder inspection statute, 2 plaintiff sought to inspect Ralston Purina's preliminary profit and loss
statement, its monthly profit analysis, and its detailed tentative balance sheet.3 The request was denied and plaintiff petitioned for a
writ of mandamus to compel the corporation to permit inspection.
He also sought to enforce the statutory forfeiture of $250 against the
corporate officer who refused to honor his inspection request. The
trial court determined that the documents were not "books" within
the meaning of the inspection statute, and thus denied both of the
shareholder's prayers.4 The St. Louis Court of Appeals held, 5 to
1358 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. 1962).
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.215 (1949). The statute provides:
"l. Each corporation shall keep correct and complete books and records of account
and shall also keep minutes of the proceedings of its shareholders and board of directors; and shall keep at its registered office or principal place of business in this state
books in which shall be recorded the number of shares subscribed, the names of the
owners of the shares, the numbers owned by them respectively, the amount of shares
paid, and by whom, the transfer of said shares with the date of transfer, the amount
of its assets and liabilities, and the names and places of residence of its officers, which
books shall be kept open for the inspection of all persons interested. Each shareholder may at all proper times have access to the books of the company, to examine
the same, and under such regulations as may be prescribed by the by-laws. (Emphasis
added.)
"2. If any officer of a corporation having charge of the books of the corporation
shall, upon the demand of a shareholder, refuse or neglect to exhibit and submit them
to examination, he shall, for each offense, forfeit the sum of two hundred and fifty
dollars."
3 Ralston Purina's preliminary profit and loss statement is a summary of the activities of the many departments and divisions of the corporation. The monthly profit
analysis showed the tonnage and production of the divisions, the breakdown of all
expenses, and the profit or loss for any given month for the various products. The
tentative balance sheet is more detailed than the regular company balance sheet. 358
S.W.2d at 774. The petitioner, a retired employee as well as shareholder of the corporation, had been able to see and inspect the documents in question while employed
by the corporation, and he sought to continue such inspection subsequent to retire.
ment. Id. at 773.
'Id. at 776.
5State ex rel. Jones v. Ralston Purina Co., 343 S.W.2d 631, 640 (Mo. App. 1961).
2
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the contrary, that the documents were "books" within the meaning
of the statute, since the information contained in them would enable
the shareholder better to understand the affairs of the corporation
and thus to protect his interests. The Supreme Court of Missouri,
considering the case on transfer, 6 however, sustained the decision
of the trial court.
Before enactment of shareholder inspection statutes such as the
Missouri statute involved in the Ralston Purina case, the American
common law had recognized that, because he is an owner, every
shareholder has the right at reasonable times and places to inspect
the books and papers of the corporation. 7 In order to exercise his
right, however, a shareholder first has to show a proper purpose for
inspection." Historically, this condition precedent to the right of
inspection allowed an opportunity for resistance by corporate officers
to efforts by minority shareholders to exercise their inspection privilege. This resistance became so notorious and so successful 9 that
toward the end of the nineteenth century, legislatures throughout
the United States found it advisable to enlarge the right of inspection by making it absolute.' 0 Notwithstanding this experience and
OThe respondent corporation based its application for transfer on Mo. CONST. art.
V, § 10 which allows transfer of a case to the state's high court because of the general
interest or importance of a question involved in the case, or for the purpose of reexamining the existing law. Respondents' Application for Transfer to the Supreme
Court of Missouri, p. 6.
7 See, e.g., Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148 (1905); Otis-Hidden Co. v. Scheirich,
187 Ky. 423, 219 S.V. 191 (1920); Klotz v. Pan-American Match Co., 221 Mass. 38, 108
N.E. 764 (1915); William Coale Development Co. v. Kennedy, 121 Ohio St. 582, 170
N.E. 434 (1930).
'E.g., News-Journal Corp. v. State ex rel. Gore, 136 Fla. 620, 187 So. 271 (1939);
Lehman v. National Benefit Ins. Co., 243 Iowa 1348, 53 N.W.2d 872 (1952); Albee v.
Lamson & Hubbard Corp., 320 Mass. 421, 69 N.E.2d 811 (1946); Bank of Giles County
v. Mason, 199 Va. 176, 98 S.E.2d 905 (1957). See also Estate of Bishop v. Antilles
Enterprises, Inc., 252 F.2d 498 (3d Cir. 1958).
'See State ex rel. Watkins v. Donnell Mfg. Co., 129 Mo. App. 206, 210, 107 S.W.
1112, 1113 (1908).
10 See Crouse v. Rogers Park Apartments, Inc., 343 Ill. App. 319, 322, 99 N.E.2d 404,
405-06 (1951); 2 HORNSTEIN, CoRpoRATIoN LAW AND PRACrbca § 611 (1959).
For example, a statute providing that certain books and records are subject to
inspection by the shareholders enlarges the common law right pertaining to those
particular books by making the right unqualified, thus entitling a shareholder to the
aid of the court to secure the inspection without first showing a proper purpose. See,
e.g., Loveman v. Tutwiler Inv. Co., 240 Ala. 424, 199 So. 854 (1941); Lehman v.
National Benefit Ins. Co., 243 Iowa 1348, 53 N.W.2d 872 (1952); State ex rel. McClure
v. Malleable Iron Range Co., 177 Wis. 582, 187 N.W. 646 (1922).
However, the courts of some states have construed their statutes to be declaratory
of or a re-enactment of the common law right. See State ex rel. O'Hara v. National
Biscuit Co., 69 N.J.L. 198, 54 At. 241 (Sup. Ct. 1903); Lauer v. Bayside Nat'l Bank,
244 App. Div. 601, 280 N.Y. Supp. 139 (1935); Hagy v. Premier Mfg. Corp., 404 Pa.
330, 172 A.2d 283 (1961).
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the resulting legislative response, the general trend of recent acts
has been, as at common law, to require a shareholder to show a
proper purpose reasonably related to his interests before lie may
invoke the statutory right of inspection."' Moreover, the courts
of some states whose statutes ostensibly confer an absolute right are
reluctant to recognize so unqualified a right. Accordingly, they hold
that, although the statutory right of inspection is absolute, issuance
of a writ of mandamus is still discretionary with the court, conditional upon the showing of proper purpose. 12 In such cases, of
course, an improper purpose is an affirmative defense which must
13
be raised and proved by the corporation.
The scope of the right granted by inspection statutes has been
construed differently in various jurisdictions. At common law, once
the shareholder has discharged his burden of showing a specific
interest and proper purpose, his right of inspection is very broad.
Corporate "books" at common law customarily includes all books,
papers, and records generally (including books of account, contracts,
federal reports, other data of the corporation concerning assets, liabilities, contracts, operations, and practices). 14 It has even been
held to encompass correspondence between the controlling officers
pertaining to the internal affairs of the corporation.'3 Unlike the
broad definition of "books" at common law, however, the statutory
scope of "books" is dependent on two variables: the language of the
statute, and the judicial interpretation of the right conferred thereunder. If the statute does not specifically mention certain books,
the scope is viewed to be co-extensive with that at common law, thus
making absolute the shareholder's inspection rights to all books
and papers from which he can derive any information that will
"'Aprovision of this type is recommended in ABA-ALI MODEL BUS. CORP. Aar § 46
(1953). See, e.g., CA.. CORP. CODE § 3003; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.45 (Smith-Hurd
1954); Onio, Rv. CODE ANN. § 1701.37 (C) (Page Supp. 1962).
A case applying the Illinois statute is Morris v. Broadview, Inc., 385 111. 228, 52
N.E.2d 769 (1944). See Rutledge, Significant Trends in Modern IncorporationStatutes,
22 WAsH. U.L.Q. 305, 331-33 (1937).
12

See, e.g., Foster v. White, 86 Ala, 467, 6 So. 88 (1889); State ex rel. Theile v.
Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. (1 W.W. Harr.) 514, 115 At. 773 (1922); White v. Manter,
109 Me. 408, 84 Atl. 890 (1912); Weinhenmayer v. Bitner, 88 Md. 325, 42 Atl. 245
(1898). Contra, Venner v. Chicago City Ry., 246 I11. 170, 92 N.E. 643 (1910); In re
Steinway,
159 N.Y. 250, 53 N.E. 1103 (1899).
1
3 See note 12 supra.
1
2 See Kemp v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 128 N.J.L. 322, 26 A.2d 70 (Sup. Ct.

1942).

21 See Otis-Hidden Co. v. Scheirich, 187 Ky. 423, 219 S.W. 191 (1920).
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enable him better to protect his interests. 6 If, on the other hand,
the statute enumerates certain books,17 it is interpreted judicially in
one of two ways.
Some courts construe the statutes literally, allowing inspection
rights to encompass only the books specifically enumerated in the
statute.' 8 Statutes so construed, therefore, are of limited scope,
making absolute the shareholder's common law right only as tothose particular books mentioned. But these courts, far from considering the statutes to be exclusive, generally hold that the common
law right obtains as to the books and records not specified or included
within the statutory provision. Thus, by literal construction, the
shareholder has a certain and expeditious means of securing inspection within the limited scope of the statute and retains his less
expeditious common law right for those documents not within the
statute. Other courts, however, construe the statutes liberally,
holding that the right extends to such books and records as are
reasonably comprehended within the terms and intendment of the
statutory specification, even though the books and records are not
specifically enumerated in the statute.19
Prior to Ralston Purina, the Supreme Court of Missouri had
neither ruled directly on a common law inspection right, nor construed the Missouri statute affording inspection rights to shareholders, though it had recognized the existence of a right of inspection in cases involving other issues.2 0 The lower appellate courts
of Missouri, while holding the general common law right of inspection to be available, 21 had construed the nature of the statutory right
10 See, e.g., Rulon v. Silverman, 79 Colo. 525, 246 Pac. 788 (1926); Stone v. Kellogg,
165 Ill. 192, 46 N.E. 222 (1896); Lewis v. Brainerd, 53 Vt. 519 (1881); State ex rel.
McClure v. Malleable Iron Range Co., 177 Wis. 582, 187 N.W. 646 (1922).
17 E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 3003 (share register, books of account, and minutes of
proceedings); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1953) (stock ledger); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32,
§ 157A5 (Smith-Hurd 1954) (books and records of account, minutes, record of shareholders); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 624 (shareholders' record and minutes of proceedings).
'18See, e.g., State ex rel. Costello v. Middlesex Banking Co., 87 Conn. 483, 88 Ad.
861 (1913); State ex rel. Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 34 Del. (4 W.W. Harr.) 81,
143 At. 257 (1926); In re Steinway, 159 N.Y. 250, 53 N.E. 1103 (1899).
19 See Ontjes v. Harrer, 208 Iowa 1217, 227 N.W. 101 (1929) ; State ex rel. McClure v.
Malleable Iron Range Co., 177 Wis. 582, 187 N.W. 646 (1922).
-o See, e.g., Bromschwig v. Carthage Marble & White Lime Co., 334 Mo. 319, 328,
66 S.W.2d 889, 893 (1933); Union Nat'l Bank v. Hunt, 76 Mo. 439, 445 (1882).
-1 "The right of a stockholder to examine and inspect all the books and records
of a corporation at all seasonable times and to be thereby informed of the condition
of the corporation and its property is a common-law right. . . . And the existence
of this right under the common law has been fully recognized in this state." State
ex rel. Doyle v. Laughlin, 53 Mo. App. 542, 546 (1893). "When the right does not
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to be absolute and vested in all shareholders. 22 However, these
courts had failed to establish conclusively whether, under the statute,
of improper
a writ of mandamus could be denied if the defense
23
purpose were successfully raised by the corporation. .
The statutory scope of corporate "books," as distinct from the
nature of the right to inspect them, had been defined in only one
Missouri case before the Ralston Purina decision.24 The St. Louis
rest on a statute, it is not absolute..... State ex tel. Johnson v. St. Louis Transit
Co., 124 Mo. App. 111,118, 100 S.W. 1126, 1128 (1907).
Accord, State ex rel. Holmes v. Doe Run Lead Co., 178 S.W. 298 (Mo. App. 1915);
State ex rel. Haeusler v. German Mut. Life Ins. Co., 169 Mo. App. 354, 152 S.W. 618
(1912); State ex rel. English v. Lazarus, 127 Mo. App. 401, 105 S.W. 780 (1907).
22
In State ex rel. Wilson v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry., 29 Mo. App. 801, 807
(1888), the court stated: "The statute . . . gave the relator a right to the inspection
claimed; and where a party has a legal right to a thing, the motive which may prompt
him in demanding his right is not the proper subject of a judicial investigation." The
court also stated, in State ex tel. Spinney v. Sportsman's Park & Club Ass'n, 29 Mo. App.
826, 331 (1888), that "where the right is clear, the fact that the information sought
to be obtained might be used for improper purposes is wholly immaterial."
Accord, State ex rel. Watkins v. Cassell, 294 S.W.2d 647, 651 (Mo. App. 1956)
(statute confers right of inspection in absolute terms); State ex rel. Holmes v. Doe
Run Lead Co., supra note 21, at 300 (statute vouchsafes right which is ordinarily
regarded as absolute); State ex rel. Haeusler v. German Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra note
21; State ex rel. Johnson v. St. Louis Transit Co., supra note 21; State ex rel. English
v. Lazarus, supra note 21.
See generally Hocker, Stockholder's Right to Inspect Corporate Books and Records
in Missouri, 8 J. Mo. B. 100 (1952); Winger, Stockholder's Right to Inspect Corporate
Books and Records in Missouri, 4 J. Mo. B. 133 (1948).
23
In the Doe Run case, supra note 22, at 300-01, the court, after noting that an
inspection statute such as the one involved here "vouchsafes to a stockholder a right
which is ordinarily regarded as absolute," stated that a court could refuse to issue a
writ of mandamus, which is discretionary in nature, if it felt that the purpose of the
inspection request was detrimental to the interests of the corporation.
The Doe Run dictum was quoted by the court in State ex rel. Manlin v. Druggists'
Addressing Co., 113 S.W.2d 1061, 1065 (Mo. App. 1938), but that case was technically
decided on other grounds.
On the basis of these cases, it has been contended that, while Missouri still recognizes the statutory right of inspection as absolute and unqualified as a substantive
rule of law, the courts have whittled away its absolute character through the exercise
of discretion in issuing the writ of mandamus. See Winger, supra note 22, at 130.
An opposing point of view is that the Doe Run and Druggists' Addressing Co.
cases did not affect the absolute and unqualified nature of the statutory inspection
right, even as to the issuance of the writ of mandamus for a proper purpose, because
these cases are not genuine holdings on the point. But even if the cases did make
the right less absolute, it is further contended that, by enactment of § 351.215 in the
1943 statute, the legislature repudiated the qualification. See Hocker, supra note 22.
As a further complication of the issue, the St. Louis Court of Appeals later stated
that a court may refuse to grant a writ of mandamus if it appears that inspection is
sought for an evil, improper, or unlawful purpose. However, the court granted the
writ even though the shareholder was seeking inspection for at least questionable
reasons. State ex rel. Watkins v. Cassell, supra note 22.
The Supreme Court of Missouri did not utilize its opportunity to clarify the law
on this question in the instant case. See note 80 infra.
.1 Cf. State ex tel. Smalley v. Stems Tire & Tube Co., 202 S.W. 459, 460 (Mo. App.
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Court of Appeals in State ex rel. Watkins v. Cassel12 5 interpreted the
term broadly by holding that both the common law and statutory
right of inspection extended to "all books, records, papers, contracts
or other instruments which will enable the stockholder better to
protect his interest and perform his duties as a stockholder." This
same court heard Ralston Purina on intermediate appeal and reversed the trial court's dismissal in reliance on its holding in the
Cassell case. 26 The supreme court rejected the Cassell interpretation
concerning the scope of the statute and held that, while the shareholder's right was absolute, the definition of "books" was limited to
those books which were required by law to be kept.2 7 The court
failed to state its reasons for choosing the strict rather than the
liberal construction of the statute, but its reasons can be ascertained
by considering the effect of each of the three alternatives which were
available to the court.
The court could have held the statutory scope of "books" to be
co-extensive with that at .common law. However, a liberal, allinclusive definition of the term, coupled with an absolute statutory
right to inspect, would afford no protection whatsoever against a
shareholder desiring to inspect the books for purposes harmful to
the company. The court was obviously concerned about the confidential nature of the documents and the harmful effects to the
corporation that could result if the information they contained
were obtained by the wrong persons.28 Therefore, by its express
1918), where the appellate court did indicate that the statute means all "books" of
the corporation, but without defining what was included in the term "books."
" 294 S.W.2d 647, 652 (Mo. App. 1956).
-0State ex rel. Jones v. Ralston Purina Co., 343 S.W.2d 631, 640 (Mo. App. 1961).

' Books required to be kept by the first sentence in § 351.215, note 2 supra, are:
a stock book, a book in which the amounts of its assets and liabilities are to be re-

corded, a book in which the names and residences of its officers are to be recorded, and
books and records of account and minutes of the proceedings of its shareholders and
boards of directors.
28 As a preliminary to its holding that the documents in question are confidential
inter-office communications and not "books," the court stated:
"The company considers the information contained in the documents so confidential
and feels that the disclosure of it is potentially of such danger to the company that
even the top officials and directors do not retain their copies, but after being reviewed
by them all copies are collected by and retained in the comptroller's office." 358
S.W.2d at 774-75.
The corporation, while not believing, or having any reason to believe, that this
shareholder would make any improper use of the information he might gain, still did
not want to be compelled to show him the documents. The corporation argued that
if it were compelled to do so in this case, it would likewise be required to allow inspection by other shareholders, including some who might use the information gained
to harm the other shareholders of the corporation. 343 S.W.2d at 634.
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rejection of the broad construction, 29 the court apparently desired
to protect the interests of the other shareholders and of the corporation itself from such possible abuses.
The second alternative open to the court was to hold that although the right of inspection was absolute and co-extensive with
the common law right, issuance of a writ of mandamus to enforce
the right is discretionary with the court and may be denied in certain circumstances. Thus the court could interpose itself to protect
the corporation and the other shareholders from abuse of the privilege. The court made no response to this alternative, 80 which,
though affording flexibility in the application of the statutory right,
would provide no predictable standard and would place the burden
of showing abusive intent on the corporation. Also, at least theoretically, it could bring about an anomalous result under the Missouri statute. 31
The last alternative, to hold that the statutory scope of "books"
is limited to those specifically enumerated in the statute, was, as we
have seen, selected by the court. One might justifiably criticize this
construction if he adheres solely to the rationale that a shareholder
should be able to inspect the books and papers that he owns to
learn about the affairs of the corporation that he owns. By this view,
the decision in Ralston Purina,at best, makes the shareholder's right
to inspect records and documents not enumerated in the statute
slower and more difficult, and, at worst, denies it altogether. 2 But
of equal importance with the right of each individual shareholder
to know about the affairs of his corporation, is the right of all the,
other shareholders and the corporation to have their interests pro29 358 S.W.2d at 777.
30 Respondents' counsel, presumably seeking resolution of the disagreement among
the authorities, discussed in note 23 supra, concerning whether a Missouri court may'
deny the writ of mandamus to compel statutory inspection if the corporation proves
the shareholder's improper purpose, specifically requested the supreme court to decide
this issue. "[lit is of general interest and of great importance to [corporations and
their shareholders] . . . that they also be informed by an informative decision of this'
Court as to the principles which should be followed by the lower courts in granting
or denying a writ of mandamus in cases such as this and the basis for review of such
actions above." Respondents' Brief, pp. 60-61.
"Since the statute not only requires inspection of the books, but also provides'
for a monetary forfeiture, enforcement of which is not discretionary, against the corporate officer denying such right, a court applying this alternative could conceivably
find itself in the position of denying a writ of mandamus to compel a corporation to
allow inspection, but in the same case having to enforce a forfeiture against the cor" ,4
poration for refusing to produce the books for inspection.
1 32 Such inspection would, of course, be denied only when the shareholder failed to'
sustain the burden of showing a proper purpose as required by the common law.
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tected. A judicial application of the inspection statute should certainly strive to accommodate each of the two considerations.
The decision in Ralston Purina seems to have achieved a fairly
equitable resolution between individual interests and the interests
of other shareholders and the corporation. The court accomplished
this result by rejecting the liberal construction of statutory corporate
"books," and acknowledging that statutory and common law inspection involve separate and distinct rights by impliedly recognizing
the availability of the broader common law right of inspection to
petitioners who properly invoke it. 83 Ralston Purina thus allows
the shareholder an unqualified right to inspect the books named in
the statute, impliedly recognizes his common law right to inspect
the other corporate records and documents, and still offers protection
to the remaining shareholders and to the corporation from the
abuses which might result if unqualified inspection of all the corporate documents and papers were allowed. For these reasons, the
decision limiting the statutory scope of corporate "books" provides
a sound policy result.
33 "The petition for the alternative writ invoked and was based solely upon that
statute, and the case having been heard and determined in the trial court on that
theory, it will be reviewed here on the same theory. . . . This effectively forecloses
consideration of any question with reference to relator's common law right of inspection, there being no such issue in the case." 358 S.W.2d at 775-76.
For comprehensive discussion of the common law and statutory inspection rights,
see FsLTcHmR, PsuvATE Coswos.AnoNs §§ 2213-57 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1952); Annots.,
22 A.L.R. 24 (1923); 43 A.L.R. 783 (1926); 59 A.L.R. 1373 (1929); 80 A.L.R. 1502

(1932); 174 A.L.R. 262 (1948).

